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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY'S APPROACH 
TO RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: A CONCEPTS PAPER 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega* 
Introduction 
The Ohio State University {OSU) is recognized as the world's 
center for the analysis of rural financial markets (RFMs) in low 
income countries (LICs) and for the design of related programs and 
policies. This recognition results from research and technical 
assistance efforts by OSU faculty and students in several dozen LICs 
over more than two decades. With steady support from the Agency 
for International Development (AID), OSU has challenged the assurnp-
tions of traditional RFM programs, has influenced the policies of 
donor agencies and LIC governments, and has developed a new concep-
tual framework for the understanding and promotion of RFM activities. 
OSU has focused on the importance of mobilizing rural financial 
savings for both depositors and intermediaries, on the nature and 
magnitude of transaction costs and on the need for cost-reducing 
technologies in RFMs, and on the limitations of using concessionary 
interest rates in attempts to promote investment, speed technologi-
cal change, or assist the poor. 
This paper presents a brief description of the development of 
OSU's conceptual framework and a summary of the lessons learned 
* This paper incorporates contributions by Dale W Adams, DOuglas 
H. Graham, and Richard L. Meyer. 
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through extensive field research and institutional experiments. 
It also describes OSU's successful model for technical assistance, 
institution building, and policy dialogue, and it briefly examines 
the main results from recent activities in Honduras, the Dominican 
Republic, Bangladesh, and Niger under OSU's Cooperative Agreement 
with AID. Finally, the paper discusses promising avenues for future 
research and experimentation and makes suggestions about AID's role. 
Role of Financial Services 
The important contributions of finance to economic development 
have been increasingly recognized. The OSU approach to RFMs has 
matured in parallel with the new views on finance and development 
pioneered by Shaw and McKinnon. Both approaches share a common 
perspective about the basic functions of financial processes and 
about the negative impacts of policies that repress financial 
markets. While the Shaw-McKinnon school focuses on macroeconomic 
stabilization and financial liberalization, OSU emphasizes the 
special problems of providing rural financial services, including 
the mobilization of deposits, the impossibility of using cheap 
credit to help the poor, and the importance of transaction costs. 
OSU has contributed new insights about the impact of policies and 
regulations on the microeconomic behavior of RFM participants and 
about the design of programs, institutions, and technologies for 
the improvement of RFMs, to complement aggregate financial reforms. 
OSU's views have stressed the link between the efficient 
provision of financial services and economic growth. First, the 
monetization of the economy (i.e., the provision of the services of 
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a means of payments) is essential for the integration of commodity 
and factor markets. Money reduces the costs of conducting trans-
actions, increasing the flow of trade and enlarging the size of 
markets, and improving the productivity of resources through 
specialization, the division of labor, greater competition, and the 
exploitation of economies of scale and uses of modern technologies. 
The importance of promoting monetization depends on the stage of 
each country's development. In the rudimentary financial markets 
of Africa, monetization is a continuing need, further linking sub-
sistence farm-households to national markets. On the other hand, in 
Latin America and Asia, the efficiency of money may be reduced by 
hyperinflation and currency substitution, thus calling attention 
to the importance of macroeconomic policies. 
Second, financial intermediation increases the rate of capital 
accumulation and improves resource allocation. In the absence of 
finance, producers are forced to take advantage of opportunities 
only to the extent allowed by their own resources, while others may 
be forced to use their marginal resources in inferior opportunities. 
There is no reason to expect that, at the same moment, those with 
a capacity to save are necessarily those with the best investment 
opportunities. By making the division of labor between savers and 
investors possible, financial intermediaries channel resources from 
producers and regions with a limited growth potential and poor 
productive opportunities to those where a more rapid expansion of 
output is possible. Intermediaries offer depositors new forms of 
holding wealth that may be more attractive than marginal uses within 
the firm-household, thus increasing incomes and eliminating inferior 
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uses of resources. At the same time, intermediaries transfer 
claims on resources to borrowers, who possess productive opportuni-
ties that otherwise would be unexploited. Thus, the financial 
system offers valuable services and income-increasing opportunities 
to both depositors and borrowers. However, many credit programs 
and institutions rely heavily upon external donor funds, are thus 
borrower-dominated, and ignore the demand for deposit services. 
osu has highlighted the welfare-increasing impact of deposit mobili-
zation, which is also crucial for strengthening intermediaries. 
Third, the financial system facilitates management of liquidity, 
risk, and reserves. The lack of synchronization between expenditures 
and receipts, so acute in agriculture, makes the management of cash 
flows expensive. Most farmers also need to accumulate stores of 
value for emergencies or to take advantage of future investment 
opportunities. In the absence of attractive domestic financial 
assets, farm-households are forced to hold foreign currencies, land, 
and other tangible assets (gold, animals, inventories of crops or 
inputs, etc.) that yield low social returns. Non-financial stores 
of value and inflation-hedges usually imply high risks and trans-
action costs, too. Livestock and inventories are subject to theft, 
disease, and depreciation, while inflation and financial repression 
shift portfolio composition away from domestic financial assets. 
Efficient financial institutions reduce the costs and risks of 
holding precautionary and speculative reserves, by offering both 
attractive deposit opportunities, for safe reserve accumulation, 
and future lines of credit to cope with emergencies, thus reducing 
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the size of desired reserves and releasing tangible resources for 
production. 
Finally, the financial system provides fiscal support for the 
public sector and contributes to the management of foreign exchange. 
Abuses of the fiscal function, however, result in inflation, devalua-
tion, and the crowding out of productive activities from credit port-
folios, jeopardizing the provision of monetization, intermediation, 
and reserve-management services. The system becomes a fiscal 
instrument to tax resources away from depositors rather than an 
intermediary between private savers and investors. 
Market fragmentation, transactions of small size, high infor-
mation costs, and substantial risks and uncertainty cause high 
transaction costs in LIC financial markets. As a result, the net 
returns to savers are low, the total costs of funds (including 
non-interest expenses) for borrowers are high, the size of financial 
markets is small, and the volume of funds mobilized and the variety 
of financial services provided are limited. Moreover, since trans-
action costs are much higher in rural than in urban areas, financial 
activities tend to be concentrated in the cities. Financial policies 
and regulations, including interest-rate restrictions and prejudices 
against informal lenders, have accentuated this urban bias and 
concentrated cheap loans in a few hands. Only a small proportion of 
the rural population has had access to formal credit, from incom-
plete, non-viable institutions, ready to offer loans but not deposit 
facilities. The funds have come from governments, central banks, 
and donors, while limited intermediation between local savers and 
investors has perpetuated large discrepancies in the marginal rates 
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of return on rural investments. 
In summary, financial services matter because they integrate 
markets, provide incentives for savings and investment, encourage 
the holding of larger proportions of wealth in the form of domestic 
financial assets, rather than unproductive inflation hedges or 
foreign assets, and channel resources away from inferior uses toward 
higher-return investments. Financial progress results from the 
reduction of risks and transaction costs, through the exploitation 
of economies of scale and of scope, the accumulation of information, 
the introduction of cost-reducing financial technologies, and the 
establishment of bank-customer relationships. In primitive econo-
mies this may involve overcoming small market size, reducing imper-
fections and fragmentation, and circumventing the restrictions 
imposed by limited education, lack of infrastructure, and low 
incomes. In more advanced economies, greater attention has to be 
devoted to the reform of repressive policies and regulations in 
order to achieve the optimum size, composition, and performance 
of the financial system. 
Development of the OSU Approach Towards RFMs 
Farm interviews in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil in the 
1960s provided OSU with an understanding of the importance of formal 
and informal finance and of the severity of the deficiencies of 
traditional agricultural credit programs. OSU began to question the 
view that most informal lenders extract large monopoly profits and 
that rural producers do not save. OSU research in Taiwan and South 
Korea in the early 1970s showed the existence of substantial small-
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farmer voluntary savings and the need for appropriate policies for 
their mobilization. For five years, OSU focused its research on 
the massive agricultural-credit programs of the 1970s in Brazil, 
where subsidized loans became the leading edge of rural development 
efforts. OSU discovered that underpriced loans were concentrated in 
the hands of the non-poor, worsening income distribution, and the 
extent to which this cheap credit was diverted to other uses or was 
leaking out of the agricultural sector altogether. These results, 
confirmed by research in Costa Rica and elsewhere, called into 
question the feasibility of using subsidized credit to stimulate 
technological change and assist the rural poor. Rather, attractive 
product and input prices and promising yields emerged as be more 
powerful incentives for the adoption of innovations. Moreover, due 
to the fungible nature of finance, serious methodological problems 
became evident in attempts to measure the alleged impact of credit 
use at the borrower level, similar to the problems encountered in 
attempts to target loans. 
In the early 1970s, OSU encouraged other researchers to work 
on the emerging problems of RFMs and helped to design and conduct 
AID's worldwide Spring Review of Small Farmer Credit. This review 
included both 10 workshops, attended by over 2,000 people, and the 
preparation of about 80 papers. This literature became a primary 
citation for those working on RFMs and showed that the problems 
identified earlier by OSU existed in many LICs. Through the years, 
OSU developed an informal network of scholars and policymakers 
around the world who have been interested in improving the func-
tioning of RFMs. Prompted by OSU's work, the World Bank, the Food 
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and Agriculture Organization, and the Interamerican Development 
Bank also increased their interest in RFM performance. 
In the late 1970s, additional OSU research in Jamaica, Costa 
Rica, Peru, Bolivia, the Philippines, and Thailand focused on the 
supply (rather than the demand) side of RFMs, financial market 
performance, and institutional behavior. It was argued that 
substantial policy changes were needed to increase the contribution 
of RFMs to growth and equity. While stressing the need to build 
strong and resilient financial systems, OSU showed that traditional 
credit policies were undermining rural development. Recommended 
policy changes included less loan targeting, more savings mobiliza-
tion, positive and uniform real rates of interest, less use of 
credit programs to compensate for other price disincentives, and new 
ways to evaluate financial projects. These efforts culminated in 
1981 with a Colloquium in Washington, D.C., co-sponsored by AID and 
the World Bank, and the publication of two policy-oriented books. 
Background of the AID-OSU Cooperative Agreement 
By the early 1980s, several of OSU's views and recommendations, 
in particular those highlighting the influence of financial and 
non-financial policies on the performance of RFMs, were achieving 
wider acceptance. These ideas provided the background for a new 
Cooperative Agreement with AID. OSU stressed how the economic 
environment and the policies that influence the level and variability 
of rural profits and of debt-repayment capacity are crucial for the 
strength and growth of rural financial institutions. Farmers who 
receive low output prices or pay high input prices, obtain poor 
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and unstable yields, and have limited access to markets and public 
services cannot become good bank clients: they will be less willing 
to borrow and repay loans, and they will be less able to save and 
place surplus funds in financial intermediaries. 
While emphasizing the need for technological innovations and 
correct price and foreign-exchange policies, OSU showed that credit 
interventions cannot correct for the negative impact of other 
policies or compensate for low returns from rural investments. 
Subsidized loans are neither an efficient nor an equitable instru-
ment to reduce the urban bias of price policies. Subsidized loans do 
not make unprofitable investments profitable. Credit does not make 
the required inputs available~ it does not build nonexistent roads, 
bridges, or storage facilities; it does not create missing markets 
or reduce yield variability. Moreover, while all farmers are harmed 
by repressive price policies, only a handful obtain compensatory 
loans, and these may not modify their investment decisions, given 
the fungibility of funds. On the other hand, much larger numbers 
of farm-households could increase their incomes and share in the 
profits generated elsewhere, if they could earn attractive returns 
on their bank deposits. Thus, while identifying the regressive 
impact of credit subsidies on income distribution, OSU emphasized 
the potential benefits for the rural population from increased 
access to attractive deposit opportunities. 
Similarly, OSU called attention to the negative impact of 
policies that reduce the degrees of freedom, impose inconsistent or 
impossible tasks on financial intermediaries, and severely constrain 
their profits. As a result of these policies, many types of finan-
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cial institutions either fail or are only moderately successful, 
depending on the degree of financial repression observed. In these 
circumstances, it is not sufficient to promote a particular kind of 
institution. 
While emphasizing the crucial influence of aggregate financial 
policies, osu also identified the deficiencies of particular 
institutional types. The reduced scope of specialized agricultural-
credit agencies and the limited opportunities to diversify their 
assets substantially increase the risk in their portfolios. Borrower-
dominated institutions lack incentives to collect loans and operate 
under interest-rate structures that reduce their viability. Institu-
tions that do not mobilize deposits from the public lose information 
about potential clients, while the public-sector sources of their 
funds restrict their flexibility and profitability. Constrained by 
interest-rate ceilings, many intermediaries find it difficult to 
cover the costs and risks of mobilizing deposits in rural areas 
and of granting credit to marginal clientele. Those that offer 
depository services, however, grow more rapidly, are more stable, 
and recover their loans more easily. 
OSU's current Cooperative Agreement stresses deposit mobiliza-
tion as an attractive focus for new policies and actions aimed at 
expanding the access of the rural population to all financial 
services. This dimension of financial intermediation presentes 
considerable scope for innovation, since many more firms and 
households can be served through deposit facilities than through 
credit. There is a continuous demand for safe and convenient means 
to manage liquid funds, and deposits provide an entry point into 
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formal finance largely under the client's control. On the other 
hand, while small, short-term loans are usually provided by informal 
credit sources at low transaction costs, institutional loans are 
demanded in response to special opportunities and require credit-
worthiness. A deposit connection with the intermediary may facili-
tate the eventual access to loans, by providing information to the 
lender, creating a basis for mutual trust, and facilitating the 
accumulation of a downpayment (the deposit}. The Cooperative 
Agreement, therefore, emphasizes pilot deposit-mobilization experi-
ments as an important step toward RFM development. Out of recent 
osu work several new lessons have been learned. 
Record and Problems of Deposit Mobilization 
Recent experiences in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and 
Bangladesh have confirmed the existence of a strong demand for rural 
deposit facilities and that financial savings can be attracted with 
appropriate incentives. In the Dominican Republic, about 21,000 
accounts and us $2.5 million were mobilized by Banco Agricola in 
the first year of operation of this new service, even under adverse 
economic circumstances. The promotion of deposit mobilization by 
credit unions has been similarly successful in this country and in 
Honduras. The rapid, voluntary growth of numerous small accounts 
has revealed a preference for this form of asset holding which 
underscores the value of deposit services for small rural households. 
The reduction of transaction costs for depositors, particularly in 
remote areas where these services had not been previously available, 
has been an important inducement, in addition to interest-rate 
- 12 -
reforms, lotteries, and the expectation of future loans. 
Agricultural development banks with an established network of 
branches have been able to mobilize deposits at a relatively low 
marginal cost, but the activity is expensive when the infrastructure 
has to be created. OSU has discovered that, in any case, deposit 
mobilization is not easy. A gestation period of complex preparation 
is frequently necessary. The management and staff of the bank (or 
the membership of the credit union) need to be convinced that the 
efforts are both desirable and feasible. The myth that the rural 
population does not possess assets that may be transformed into 
deposits and does not have a margin over consumption for further 
accumulation needs to be questioned. Evidence has to be provided 
to show that potential depositors respond to higher returns, to 
lower transaction costs, to greater liquidity and security, and 
to other economic incentives. The institution's management must 
understand the problems associated with subsidized credit, high 
default rates, and dependence on outside financing if internal 
opposition is to be eliminated. OSU's technical assistance has 
played a key role in bringing about this understanding of the 
need for, and benefits from, deposit mobilization. 
Similarly, political support for institutional and policy 
reforms must be obtained from the domestic authorities and the 
foreign donors. osu has played an important role in initiating 
thinking about the need for financial reform, while promoting 
substantial local involvement in the process. In the DOminican 
Republic, for example, a combination of public discussion over 
the years, research by Dominicans, in-depth policy dialogue, and 
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operational innovations on a pilot basis, supported and encouraged 
by flexible AID-sponsored technical assistance, has been a powerful 
yet subtle force for change. 
Deposit mobilization, moreover, usually forces the intermediary 
to deal with "second-generation" problems and face new dilemmas 
about managerial strategy and organization. New data processing 
needs, liquidity-management requirements, portfolio choice and 
loan-collection options have to be dealt with. At the same time, 
as the institution becomes less "borrower-dominated", new challenges 
appear. Branch managers must quickly convert mobilized funds into 
loans, but must also find borrowers with a high probability of 
repayment. A less borrower-dominated environment induces stricter 
loan-evaluation procedures, more aggressive loan-recovery practices, 
and greater concern about the pricing of loans to cover depositor 
returns and operational costs. At the same time, given the growth 
of loanable funds, delinquent borrowers have an incentive to repay 
in order to gain access to a continuing stream of future loans. 
Rapid and drastic changes in bank and credit union behavior have 
been observed both in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. Given 
the new awareness about profitability, the intermediaries have 
revised their interest-rate structures and have attempted to re-
duce their operational costs. This has brought about changes in 
institutional structure, managerial policies, and administrative 
procedures, and has raised fundamental questions about national 
financial regulations. In the experiments conducted under the 
Cooperative Agreement, all of these changes have increased 
institutional viability and efficiency. 
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Towards A General Systems Approach to RFMs 
OVer the years, a new approach to the analysis and development 
of RFMs has evolved from OSU's work. The trend has been to move 
away from partial views and actions towards a general-equilibrium, 
system-wide perspective. Thus, rather than evaluating the farm-
level impact of isolated credit projects, OSU has promoted a systems 
approach to assessing the performance of RFMs. While traditionally 
the emphasis had been on projects, osu stresses markets. While 
traditionally the emphasis has been on loans, OSU recognizes the 
importance of several types of financial services and attempts to 
redress the neglect of deposit mobilization. While traditionally 
evaluation centered (unsuccessfully) on the alleged farm-level 
impact of transitory subsidized loans, osu has insisted on the 
need to create complete, permanent, and viable institutions. What 
matters is the cost, quality, and permanence of the financial 
services offered. While traditionally credit programs have been 
targeted toward specific groups and loans for particular uses, osu 
recognizes that a viable financial institution must diversify its 
portfolio and smooth its flows of funds over time by serving numer-
ous and diverse rural populations, in order to reduce risks and 
manage liquidity. Recognizing the fungibility of funds, osu has 
contrasted the limited success of end-use targeting with the high 
transaction costs it imposes on financial market participants. 
Moreover, to compete successfully, institutional intermediaries 
must avoid artificial distinctions about uses of funds and must 
provide a reliable, flexible set of services. Economies of scale 
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and of scope can be substantial for financial market participants. 
While traditional views emphasized the need to keep interest rates 
low, OSU insists that what matters is the total cost of funds to 
borrowers, the net return on deposits to savers, and the financial 
survival of intermediaries. 
Transaction costs have come to occupy a central position in 
OSU's analysis. Their reduction constitutes the main mechanism of 
financial progress, and their magnitude the most important indicator 
of the degree of efficiency of RFMs. The methodologies to measure 
transaction costs first tested by osu in Jamaica and Honduras and 
later applied in Costa Rica, the DOminican Republic, Panama, Peru, 
Ecuador and several other countries have shown that all of the 
components of the total transaction costs of financial activities 
in the rural areas of LICs are substantial. They also are highly 
dispersed, signaling major market fragmentation. Given their 
inverse relationship with loan size, these transaction costs are 
highly regressive, excluding many potential small depositors and 
borrowers from market participation. OSU has shown that a substan-
tial portion of operational lending costs results from the loan 
targeting usually required by donors, reflecting the screening, 
documentation, supervision, and extensive reporting requirements 
associated with a multitude of separate special lines of credit. 
Other research has shown that interest rate restrictions increase 
borrowing costs, through the implicit pricing that results from 
the rationing behavior of lenders attempting to clear the market. 
As a result, low interest-rate loans are not necessarily cheap for 
the borrowers and, given their regressivity, may not even reach 
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the small and poor farmers. Thus, raising interest rates may have 
a progressive impact, transmitting a greater relative increase in 
the total cost of funds to large borrowers than to small clients. 
Obstacles to the Expansion of Rural Financial Services 
The provision of financial services is a difficult and expen-
sive task, but it can play a key role in promoting the development 
and welfare of the rural areas. The special nature of rural 
economies explains part of the difficulties. Potential depositors 
and borrowers are very heterogeneous and geographically dispersed, 
their financial transactions are numerous and small, and they 
encounter high risks. The resulting high transaction costs reduce 
both the demand for and supply of financial services. Potential 
depositors find that transaction costs reduce the net returns on 
financial savings, while potential borrowers find that the costs 
of loans are high when non-interest transaction expenses are added. 
Lenders perceive the costs of managing numerous small savings 
accounts and determining the creditworthiness of small, diverse 
producers to be high, given the scarcity of information and the 
nature of the risks involved. 
Economic policies that repress rural incomes and increase their 
variability further constrain deposit and loan demand and reduce 
creditworthiness. At the same time, rigid and inappropriate finan-
cial policies contract the supply of financial services, reduce the 
profitability of servicing rural clientele, and force intermediaries 
to evade the impact of regulations by withdrawing from the country-
side. The limited scope of specialized credit institutions, created 
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solely for the disbursement of agricultural loans, on concessionary 
terms, for narrowly defined target populations, has reduced their 
viability. They have been incomplete intermediaries that neglect 
deposit mobilization, experience high default rates, impose high 
transaction costs on their target clientele, and lack viability. 
Over the years, osu has dealt with several of these obstacles 
to an expanded supply of rural financial services. In the 1970s 
emphasis was placed on the role of policies. While insisting on 
the overall need to modify price and other non-financial policies, 
osu concentrated attention on the importance of financial reforms, 
especially a revision of interest-rate policies. These efforts 
culminated in the 1981 Colloquium and a generalized acceptance of 
the desirability of positive, more uniform real rates of interest, 
a recommendation that any agricultural credit practitioner immed-
iately associates with osu. 
The more recent Cooperative Agreement, however, provided osu 
with the opportunity to go well beyond this. The existence of rural 
demand for deposits was corroborated and the superior performance 
of complete intermediaries which mobilize deposits was demonstrated. 
The recent successes have also suggested new areas of concern and 
have revealed the extent of the task still to be completed. The 
challenge of the "second-generation" problems of deposit mobilization 
is only now being met, as it has become clear that only new cost-
reducing technologies will make the supply of financial services in 
the rural areas more efficient. The nature of these technologies 
will depend on the stage of development and degree of market 
integration of each country. These new technologies include the 
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development of a physical infrastructure (branches, mobile units, 
microcomputers), new deposit instruments, new institutional designs 
and organization. An appropriate division of labor and efficient 
linkages among several types of intermediaries must be developed. 
The Role of AID in Future RFM Activities 
OVer the years, with substantial AID support, OSU has developed 
a new conceptual framework for the understanding of RFMs, has con-
vinced donors and LIC governments to conduct experiments and modify 
policies and institutions, and has provided the field research, 
technical assistance, and policy dialogue required for an improved 
supply of rural finance. Recent progress and success of OSU 
projects, moreover, has revealed the complexity of the task and the 
nature of the ingredients yet to be added. The AID-OSU partnership 
is in a unique position to contribute to the remaining components 
of this market-building process. 
The AID-OSU comparative advantages in this field are evident. 
AID is operating in many countries, particularly in those with major 
rural-development problems, on a long-term basis. The missions 
know the political environment well and provide the continuity and 
sensitivity for a successful policy-dialogue and institution-building 
process. AID has shown more inclination than other donors to sponsor 
high-risk experiments, innovations, and pilot projects. Comparatively, 
it has placed more emphasis on technical assistance than on outright 
capital transfers. OSU has not only developed a solid and operational 
conceptual framework, but it has also accumulated the considerable 
field experience required for dealing with the "second-generation" 
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problems at the microeconomic level and for the development and 
adaptation to local environments and institutions of new financial 
technologies. OSU's modalities of technical assistance and policy 
dialogue not only have been well adapted to the needs of AID missions, 
but have recently been extremely successful, as a result of sustained 
efforts over many years. OSU associates and alumni in prominent LIC 
positions are increasingly encouraging RFM reforms. Close collabora-
tion with local researchers and institutions has resulted in a very 
effective transfer of techniques of analysis and of implementation 
strategies extremely important for institution building. 
Recognition of the crucial importance of an efficient supply 
of financial services has led the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund to promote aggregate financial-market reforms in many 
LICs, as part of their stabilization programs and structural-adjust-
ment loans. The complexity of these exercises and the inclination 
of these donors have led them to frequently ignore the special 
problems and needs of RFMs. By treating the financial system as a 
"black box," they have frequently downplayed the practical problems 
of creating viable institutions. This neglect accentuates the urban 
bias of financial development and perpetuates the limited degree of 
access of the rural population to financial services. The "black-
box" needs to be examined and the technologies created, if these 
services are going to be expanded. OSU has urged policymakers not 
to bypass RFMs and to meet the additional challenges posed by their 
development. Only sustained field work, detailed technical assist-
ance, and microeconomic experimentation --not typical of other 
donors-- will provide the answers to this challenge. AID possesses 
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clear comparative advantages to meet this need. 
Future AID work on RFMs must combine three crucially inter-
related elements. First, an appropriate policy and regulatory 
environment has to be created. The lessons learned by osu in the 
field represent a key catalyst for this policy dialogue. Second, 
new cost-reducing innovations have to be designed, tested, and 
adapted to local circumstances. OSU's recent experiments suggest 
the scope and sources of successful financial technologies. Third, 
viable institutions have to be created. A mechanism for the 
transfer of an analytical framework for successful policy and 
management decisions is a crucial component of institution building. 
If the policy environment is not hospitable, financial inter-
mediaries will not survive. Positive real rates of interest on 
loans and deposits and non-preferential rates of interest for 
Central Bank rediscounting, low and uniform reserve requirements, 
and limited targeting are among the most basic policy goals. 
OSU has learned that local experiments and research are a powerful 
tools for bringing about these policy reforms. 
Appropriate policies, however, are not a sufficient condition 
for the expansion of RFMs. Given the magnitude and dispersion 
of transaction costs in LICs, new production functions of rural 
financial services will be required. Only lower-cost technologies 
for deposit and loan activities will make rural intermediaries 
viable and will increase access to rural finance. very little work 
has been done, however, on the technology of financial services, 
probably because the payoffs were limited given financial repres-
sion. As aggregate financial reforms provide the appropriate 
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incentives, however, new technologies will be needed to take 
advantage of socially profitable opportunities for expanding RFMs 
and to guarantee the viability and permanence of rural financial 
institutions. New technologies are also needed to substantially 
reduce uncertainty and facilitate management of the remaining risk. 
These technologies can only be developed through field testing, 
contrasting, experiences, and experimentation. 
Moreover, institutional and technological innovations will have 
to be adapted to the particular market size and degree of market 
integration and to the country's stage of development. Appropriate 
financial technologies are essential for economizing the use of 
resources in the operation of financial institutions and to reduce 
transaction costs. What is appropriate, will depend on the resourses 
available and the economic environment. While in Lating America 
policies may be emphasized, institution building is crucial in Africa. 
Furthermore, an efficient division of labor between formal and 
informal intermediaries and among institutional types (public develop-
ment banks, private rural banks, and credit unions) is required, com-
plemented by the development of cost-efficient linkages (at the whole-
sale and retail levels) to guarantee the smooth operation of the whole 
system. Technologies, institution building, and policy reforms will 
reinforce each other. Substantial efforts will be required, however, 
to implement the needed policy reforms, create viable institutions, 
and accelerate cost-reducing technological change in RFMs. With AID 
support, OSU can extend the successful models that it has recently 
developed to new countries, new institutions, and new sectors of the 
economy, to make financial markets work more efficiently and equitably. 
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